entropy(7) - NetBSD Manual Pages

ENTROPY(7)          NetBSD Miscellaneous Information Manual         ENTROPY(7)


NAME

     entropy -- random unpredictable secrets needed for security


DESCRIPTION

     Computers need random unpredictable secrets for the security of software
     such as web browsers and ssh(1).

     Computers are designed to behave in highly predictable ways, so they rely
     on observations of random physical phenomena around them, called entropy
     sources, to derive unpredictable secrets for cryptography.

     While some computers have reliable entropy sources such as hardware ran-
     dom number generators based on thermal noise in silicon circuits, others
     may require operator intervention for security.

   Threats
     ·   Web browsers and programs such as ssh(1) rely on unpredictable
         secrets in cryptography to prevent eavesdropping and detect tampering
         of sessions over the network.

     ·   ssh-keygen(1) relies on unpredictable secrets to create keys that
         allow you to log in but keep out malicious adversaries; if an adver-
         sary could guess the key then they could impersonate you.

     ·   NetBSD relies on unpredictable secrets to make sure that private user
         data stored on nonvolatile media when memory is scarce (swapctl(8),
         using `vm.swap_encrypt=1'; see sysctl(7)) cannot be recovered by
         forensic tools after shutdown.

   Entropy in NetBSD
     NetBSD gathers samples from various kinds of entropy sources, including:
     ·   hardware random number generators
     ·   network traffic timing
     ·   user input (keystrokes, mouse movements, etc.)
     ·   disk I/O latency
     ·   environment sensors (envsys(4))
     The samples are mixed together with cryptography to yield unpredictable
     secrets through /dev/urandom (see rnd(4)) and related interfaces used by
     programs like ssh(1), Firefox, and so on.

     NetBSD also stores a random seed at /var/db/entropy-file to carry unpre-
     dictable secrets over from one boot to the next, as long as the medium
     remains secret and can be updated on boot.  The seed is maintained auto-
     matically by /etc/rc.d/random_seed (see rc.conf(5)).

   Ensuring enough entropy
     Entropy is measured in bits, and only 256 bits of entropy are needed for
     security, thanks to modern cryptography.

     To detect potentially insecure systems, NetBSD takes measures to alert
     the operator if there isn't definitely enough for security:

     ·   NetBSD issues warnings on the console if there's not enough entropy
         when programs need it; see rnd(4).

     ·   The motd(5) has a warning if there was not enough entropy when net-
         work daemons such as sshd(8) first generated keys.

     ·   The daily security report includes an alert if there's still not
         enough entropy; see security.conf(5).

     Since it is hard to know how unpredictable most physical systems are,
     only devices specifically designed to be hardware random number genera-
     tors, or a seed file stored on disk, count toward these alerts.

     At boot, NetBSD will wait, when `entropy=wait' is set in rc.conf(5), or
     fail to single-user mode, when `entropy=check' is set, if there is not
     enough entropy from any sources, including devices not designed to be
     unpredictable, such as the CPU cycle counter sampled by a periodic timer,
     provided the samples pass a simple filter called the `entropy estimator',
     like other operating systems.  Sources known to be predictable, which
     could give a false sense of security, can be disabled from unblocking
     boot by setting rndctl_flags in rc.conf(5).

     Many new computers have hardware random number generators, such as
     RDRAND/RDSEED in Intel/AMD CPUs, or ARMv8.5-RNDRRS; virtio(4)-based vir-
     tualization platforms such as QEMU can expose entropy from the host with
     viornd(4); bootloader firmware such as UEFI may also expose an underlying
     platform's random number generator.

     However, many older computers have no reliable entropy sources.  Some
     have the hardware, but have it off by default, such as a disabled tpm(4).
     On computers with no built-in reliable entropy source, you may wish to
     transfer a seed from another computer with rndctl(8), or manually enter
     samples into /dev/urandom -- see below.

   Adding entropy
     You can manually save and load seeds with the rndctl(8) tool.  For exam-
     ple, you might use
           rndctl -S seed
     to save a seed from one machine, transfer it -- over a medium where you
     are confident there are no eavesdroppers -- to another machine, and load
     it with
           rndctl -L seed
     on the target machine; then run
           /etc/rc.d/random_seed stop
     on the target machine to ensure that the entropy will be saved for next
     boot, even if the system later crashes or otherwise shuts down uncleanly.
     rndctl -S records the number of bits of entropy in the seed so that
     rndctl -L can count it.

     Users can write data to /dev/urandom to be mixed together with all other
     samples.  For example, no matter what entropy sources are built into a
     computer, you can ensure it has enough entropy (as long as there are no
     surveillance cameras watching you) by flipping a coin 256 times and run-
     ning:
           echo thttthhhhttththtttht... > /dev/urandom
     Then run
           /etc/rc.d/random_seed stop
     to ensure that the effort will be saved for next boot.

     Inputs from the superuser (uid 0) to /dev/urandom count toward the sys-
     tem's entropy estimate, at the maximum rate of one bit of entropy per bit
     of data; inputs from unprivileged users will affect subsequent outputs
     but will be counted as having zero entropy.

     After adding entropy, make sure to regenerate any long-term keys that
     might be predictable because they were previously generated with too lit-
     tle entropy.  For example, if `sshd=YES' is enabled in /etc/rc.conf, then
     NetBSD will automatically generate ssh host keys on boot; if they were
     generated with too little entropy, then you may wish to delete them and
     create new ones before allowing anyone to log in via ssh(1).


DIAGNOSTICS

     NetBSD may print the following warnings to the console:

     WARNING: system needs entropy for security; see entropy(7)  Some process
     tried to draw use entropy from NetBSD, e.g. to generate a key for cryp-
     tography, before enough inputs from reliable entropy sources have been
     obtained.  The entropy may be low enough that an adversary could guess
     keys by brute force.

     This message is rate-limited, so if you have added entropy and want to
     verify that the problem is resolved, you should consult the
     kern.entropy.needed sysctl(7) variable to confirm it is zero, rather than
     just look for the absence of this message; see rnd(4) for details.


SEE ALSO

     getrandom(2), arc4random(3), rnd(4), rc.conf(5), rc(8), rndctl(8)

     Nadia Heninger, Zakir Durumeric, Eric Wustrow, and J. Alex Halderman,
     "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network
     Devices", Proceedings of the 21st USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX,
     https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity12/technical-
     sessions/presentation/heninger https://factorable.net/, 205-220, August
     2012.

     openssl -- predictable random number generator, Debian Security Advisory,
     https://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1571.html, 2008-05-13,
     DSA-1571-1.

     Features/VirtIORNG, QEMU Wiki, https://wiki.qemu.org/Features/VirtIORNG,
     2016-10-17.

NetBSD 10.99                     June 30, 2023                    NetBSD 10.99