EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7) - NetBSD Manual Pages

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EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7)                   OpenSSL                  EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7)




NAME

       EVP_KDF-PBKDF2 - The PBKDF2 EVP_KDF implementation


DESCRIPTION

       Support for computing the PBKDF2 password-based KDF through the EVP_KDF
       API.

       The EVP_KDF-PBKDF2 algorithm implements the PBKDF2 password-based key
       derivation function, as described in SP800-132; it derives a key from a
       password using a salt and iteration count.

   Identity
       "PBKDF2" is the name for this implementation; it can be used with the
       EVP_KDF_fetch() function.

   Supported parameters
       The supported parameters are:

       "pass" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD) <octet string>
       "salt" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT) <octet string>
       "iter" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER) <unsigned integer>
           This parameter has a default value of 2048.

       "properties" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES) <UTF8 string>
       "digest" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST) <UTF8 string>
           These parameters work as described in "PARAMETERS" in EVP_KDF(3).

       "pkcs5" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5) <integer>
           This parameter can be used to enable or disable SP800-132
           compliance checks.  Setting the mode to 0 enables the compliance
           checks.

           The checks performed are:

           - the iteration count is at least 1000.
           - the salt length is at least 128 bits.
           - the derived key length is at least 112 bits.

           The default provider uses a default mode of 1 for backwards
           compatibility, and the FIPS provider uses a default mode of 0.

           The value string is expected to be a decimal number 0 or 1.


NOTES

       A typical application of this algorithm is to derive keying material
       for an encryption algorithm from a password in the "pass", a salt in
       "salt", and an iteration count.

       Increasing the "iter" parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it
       harder for an attacker to perform a brute force attack using a large
       number of candidate passwords.

       No assumption is made regarding the given password; it is simply
       treated as a byte sequence.


CONFORMING TO

       SP800-132


SEE ALSO

       EVP_KDF(3), EVP_KDF_CTX_new(3), EVP_KDF_CTX_free(3),
       EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(3), EVP_KDF_derive(3), "PARAMETERS" in
       EVP_KDF(3)


HISTORY

       This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0.


COPYRIGHT

       Copyright 2018-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
       this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
       in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
       <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.



3.0.15                            2024-09-03                 EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7)