SSL_alert_type_string(3) OpenSSL SSL_alert_type_string(3)
NAME
SSL_alert_type_string, SSL_alert_type_string_long, SSL_alert_desc_string, SSL_alert_desc_string_long - get textual description of alert information
LIBRARY
libcrypto, -lcrypto
SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h> const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
DESCRIPTION
SSL_alert_type_string() returns a one letter string indicating the type of the alert specified by value. SSL_alert_type_string_long() returns a string indicating the type of the alert specified by value. SSL_alert_desc_string() returns a two letter string as a short form describing the reason of the alert specified by value. SSL_alert_desc_string_long() returns a string describing the reason of the alert specified by value.
NOTES
When one side of an SSL/TLS communication wants to inform the peer about a special situation, it sends an alert. The alert is sent as a special message and does not influence the normal data stream (unless its contents results in the communication being canceled). A warning alert is sent, when a non-fatal error condition occurs. The "close notify" alert is sent as a warning alert. Other examples for non-fatal errors are certificate errors ("certificate expired", "unsup- ported certificate"), for which a warning alert may be sent. (The sending party may however decide to send a fatal error.) The receiving side may cancel the connection on reception of a warning alert on it discretion. Several alert messages must be sent as fatal alert messages as speci- fied by the TLS RFC. A fatal alert always leads to a connection abort.
RETURN VALUES
The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_type_string() or SSL_alert_type_string_long(): "W"/"warning" "F"/"fatal" "U"/"unknown" This indicates that no support is available for this alert type. Probably value does not contain a correct alert message. The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_desc_string() or SSL_alert_desc_string_long(): "CN"/"close notify" The connection shall be closed. This is a warning alert. "UM"/"unexpected message" An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper imple- mentations. "BM"/"bad record mac" This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This message is always fatal. "DF"/"decompression failure" The decompression function received improper input (e.g. data that would expand to excessive length). This message is always fatal. "HF"/"handshake failure" Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security param- eters given the options available. This is a fatal error. "NC"/"no certificate" A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not send a certificate (SSLv3 only). "BC"/"bad certificate" A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc "UC"/"unsupported certificate" A certificate was of an unsupported type. "CR"/"certificate revoked" A certificate was revoked by its signer. "CE"/"certificate expired" A certificate has expired or is not currently valid. "CU"/"certificate unknown" Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable. "IP"/"illegal parameter" A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This is always fatal. "DC"/"decryption failed" A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal. "RO"/"record overflow" A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than 2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal. "CA"/"unknown CA" A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message is always fatal. "AD"/"access denied" A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal. "DE"/"decode error" A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal. "CY"/"decrypt error" A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or vali- date a finished message. "ER"/"export restriction" A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit ephemeral RSA key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This message is always fatal. "PV"/"protocol version" The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is rec- ognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons). This message is always fatal. "IS"/"insufficient security" Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is always fatal. "IE"/"internal error" An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory alloca- tion failure). This message is always fatal. "US"/"user canceled" This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the hand- shake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning. "NR"/"no renegotiation" Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that is not appro- priate, the recipient should respond with this alert; at that point, the original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this would be appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters (key length, authentica- tion, etc.) at startup and it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This message is always a warning. "UK"/"unknown" This indicates that no description is available for this alert type. Probably value does not contain a correct alert message.
SEE ALSO
ssl(3), SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3) 0.9.9-dev 2003-07-24 SSL_alert_type_string(3)
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