init(8) - NetBSD Manual Pages

INIT(8)                 NetBSD System Manager's Manual                 INIT(8)


NAME

     init - process control initialization


SYNOPSIS

     init


DESCRIPTION

     The init program is the last stage of the boot process (after the kernel
     loads and initializes all the devices).  It normally begins multi-user
     operation.

     The following table describes the state machine used by init:

     1.   Single user shell.  init may be passed -s from the boot program to
          prevent the system from going multi-user and to instead execute a
          single user shell without starting the normal daemons.  The system
          is then quiescent for maintenance work and may later be made to go
          to state 2 (multi-user) by exiting the single-user shell (with ^D).

     2.   Multi-user boot (default operation).  Executes /etc/rc (see rc(8)).
          If this was the first state entered (as opposed to entering here
          after state 1), then /etc/rc will be invoked with its first argument
          being `autoboot'.  If /etc/rc exits with a non-zero (error) exit
          code, commence single user operation by giving the super-user a
          shell on the console by going to state 1 (single user).  Otherwise,
          proceed to state 3.

     3.   Set up ttys as specified in ttys(5).  See below for more informa-
          tion.  On completion, continue to state 4.

     4.   Multi-user operation.  Depending upon the signal received, change
          state appropriately; on SIGTERM, go to state 7; on SIGHUP, go to
          state 5; on SIGTSTP, go to state 6.

     5.   Clean-up mode; re-read ttys(5), killing off the controlling pro-
          cesses on lines that are now `off', and starting processes that are
          newly `on'.  On completion, go to state 4.

     6.   `Boring' mode; no new sessions.  Signals as per state 4.

     7.   Shutdown mode.  Send SIGHUP to all controlling processes, reap the
          processes for 30 seconds, and the go to state 1 (single user); warn-
          ing if not all the processes died.

     If the `console' entry in the ttys(5) file is marked ``insecure'', then
     init will require that the superuser password be entered before the sys-
     tem will start a single-user shell.  The password check is skipped if the
     `console' is marked as ``secure''.

     The kernel runs with four different levels of security.  Any superuser
     process can raise the security level, but only init can lower it.

     The security level mechanism is intended to allow the administrator to
     protect the persistent code and data on the system, or a subset thereof,
     from modification, even by the superuser.  In order for this protection
     to be effective, the administrator must ensure that no program that is
     run while the security level is 0 or lower, nor any data or configuration
     file used by any such program, can be modified while the security level
     is greater than 0.  This may be achieved through the careful use of the
     ``immutable'' file flag to define and protect a Trusted Computing Base
     (TCB) consisting of all such programs and data, or by ensuring that all
     such programs and data are on filesystems that are mounted read-only and
     running at security level 2 or higher.  Particular care must be taken to
     ensure, if relying upon security level 1 and the use of file flags, that
     the integrity of the TCB cannot be compromised through the use of
     modifications to the disklabel or access to overlapping disk partitions,
     including the raw partition.

     Do not overlook the fact that shell scripts (or anything else fed to an
     interpreter, through any mechanism) and the kernel itself are "programs
     that run while the security level is 0" and must be considered part of
     the TCB.

     Security levels are defined as follows:

     -1    Permanently insecure mode - always run system in level 0 mode.

     0     Insecure mode - immutable and append-only flags may be changed.
           All devices may be read or written subject to their permissions.

     1     Secure mode - system immutable and system append-only flags may not
           be turned off; disks for mounted filesystems, /dev/mem, and
           /dev/kmem are read-only.

           The verified exec in-kernel fingerprint table may not be changed
           (see veriexecctl(8)).

     2     Highly secure mode - same as secure mode, plus disks are always
           read-only whether mounted or not, new disks may not be mounted, and
           existing mounts may only be downgraded from read-write to read-
           only.  This level precludes tampering with filesystems by unmount-
           ing them, but also inhibits running newfs(8) while the system is
           multi-user.

           The settimeofday(2) system call can only advance the time.

           The state of ipf(8) (the in-kernel IP filtering facility) may not
           be changed.

           Users may not change the per-process core name template format,
           only the default can be changed.

           Downgrading from highly secure mode to insecure mode (that is, to
           single-user mode) always requires the root password to be entered
           on the console, whether the console is marked as ``secure'' in
           /etc/ttys or not.

     Normally, the system runs in level 0 mode while single user and in level
     1 mode while multi-user.  If the level 2 mode is desired while running
     multi-user, it can be set in the startup script /etc/rc using sysctl(8).
     If it is desired to run the system in level 0 mode while multi-user, the
     administrator must build a kernel with options INSECURE in the kernel
     configuration file, which initializes the kernel's securelevel variable
     to -1.  See options(4) and config(8) for details.

     In multi-user operation, init maintains processes for the terminal ports
     found in the file ttys(5).  init reads this file, and executes the com-
     mand found in the second field.  This command is usually getty(8); it
     opens and initializes the tty line and executes the login(1) program.
     The login(1) program, when a valid user logs in, executes a shell for
     that user.  When this shell dies, either because the user logged out or
     an abnormal termination occurred (a signal), the init program wakes up,
     deletes the user from the utmp(5) file of current users and records the
     logout in the wtmp(5) file.  The cycle is then restarted by init execut-
     ing a new getty(8) for the line.

     Line status (on, off, secure, getty, or window information) may be
     changed in the ttys(5) file without a reboot by sending the signal SIGHUP
     to init with the command ``kill -s HUP 1''.  This is referenced in the
     table above as state 5.  On receipt of this signal, init re-reads the
     ttys(5) file.  When a line is turned off in ttys(5), init will send a
     SIGHUP signal to the controlling process for the session associated with
     the line.  For any lines that were previously turned off in the ttys(5)
     file and are now on, init executes a new getty(8) to enable a new login.
     If the getty or window field for a line is changed, the change takes
     effect at the end of the current login session (e.g., the next time init
     starts a process on the line).  If a line is commented out or deleted
     from ttys(5), init will not do anything at all to that line.  However, it
     will complain that the relationship between lines in the ttys(5) file and
     records in the utmp(5) file is out of sync, so this practice is not rec-
     ommended.

     init will terminate multi-user operations and resume single-user mode if
     sent a terminate (TERM) signal, for example, ``kill -s TERM 1''.  If
     there are processes outstanding that are deadlocked (because of hardware
     or software failure), init will not wait for them all to die (which might
     take forever), but will time out after 30 seconds and print a warning
     message.

     init will cease creating new getty(8)'s and allow the system to slowly
     die away, if it is sent a terminal stop (TSTP) signal, i.e.  ``kill -s
     TSTP 1''.  A later hangup will resume full multi-user operations, or a
     terminate will start a single user shell.  This hook is used by reboot(8)
     and halt(8).

     The role of init is so critical that if it dies, the system will reboot
     itself automatically.  If, at bootstrap time, the init process cannot be
     located, the system will panic with the message ``panic: init died
     (signal %d, exit %d)''.


FILES

     /dev/console   System console device.
     /dev/tty*      Terminal ports found in ttys(5).
     /var/run/utmp  Record of Current users on the system.
     /var/log/wtmp  Record of all logins and logouts.
     /etc/ttys      The terminal initialization information file.
     /etc/rc        System startup commands.


DIAGNOSTICS

     getty repeating too quickly on port %s, sleeping  A process being started
     to service a line is exiting quickly each time it is started.  This is
     often caused by a ringing or noisy terminal line.  Init will sleep for 10
     seconds, then continue trying to start the process.

     some processes would not die; ps axl advised.  A process is hung and
     could not be killed when the system was shutting down.  This condition is
     usually caused by a process that is stuck in a device driver because of a
     persistent device error condition.


SEE ALSO

     kill(1), login(1), sh(1), options(4), ttys(5), config(8), getty(8),
     halt(8), rc(8), reboot(8), shutdown(8)


HISTORY

     A init command appeared in Version 6 AT&T UNIX.


BUGS

     Systems without sysctl(8) behave as though they have security level -1.

     The security level 2 restrictions relating to TCB integrity protection
     should be enforced at security level 1.  Restrictions dependent upon
     security level but not relating to TCB integrity protection should be
     selected by sysctl(8) settings available only at security level 0 or
     lower.

NetBSD 2.0                     February 19, 2004                    NetBSD 2.0